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ILLUSION OR PROTECTION? FREE
EXERCISE RIGHTS AND LAWS
MANDATING INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF CONTRACEPTION

EDWARD T. MECHMANN, ESQ.*
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many state legislatures and the United
States Congress, have introduced bills to require employee
benefit plans and health insurance providers to include coverage
for contraceptives. These bills are a major legislative objective
for certain women's organizations and "pro-choice" groups. The
bills, however, clearly raise troubling problems for Catholic
institutions, unless the bills provide for exemptions that would
respect faith-based objections to the covered medications and
procedures. If the legislature refuses to include a "conscience
clause" in the bill itself, can the Church find relief in court? To
put the question more specifically, does either federal or state
constitutional law require a "conscience clause" exempting
religious employers and insurance providers from legislation
mandating coverage of certain procedures or medications in all
health insurance plans?
This article will examine this question in the context of
several insurance mandate bills considered by the New York
State Legislature in 2001 that do not include a conscience clause.
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I will argue that under current jurisprudence a "conscience
clause" is not required by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Although New York State constitutional
law may rely on a more favorable standard, it is not certain that
a religious exemption could be obtained. A carefully-drafted
federal conscience protection bill is the only sure way to obtain
relief.
I. CONTRACEPTIVE MANDATE BILLS

There are a variety of bills that have been introduced and
enacted across the United States to require coverage of
contraceptives by all health insurance plans that already cover
other prescription medications. A bill passed by the New York
State Assembly in 2001 is typical:
Every policy which provides coverage for
prescription drugs shall include coverage for the
cost of contraceptive drugs or devices approved by
the Food and Drug Administration of the United
States government or generic equivalents approved
as substitutes by
such Food and Drug
Administration under the prescription of a health
care provider .... 1
It is also common for states that pass such laws to include a
conscience clause that provides an exemption for religious
organizations. The clause in a bill passed by the New York State
Senate is representative:
Provided, however, if the group or entity, on whose
behalf the policy is issued is operated, supervised
or controlled by or in connection with a religious
A.02002, 2001 Leg. at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/bn=A02002&sh=t
(last visited Nov. 5, 2001).
The following states have enacted contraceptive
mandate laws and/or administrative rules related to insurance coverage for
contraceptives: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
See National
Conference of State Legislatures, "Women's Health: Health Insurance for
Contraceptives," available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/contrace.htm
(last updated Oct. 2001). Federal employee benefit plans are also required to
provide contraceptive coverage.
Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-58, §635, 113 Stat. 430, 474 (1999).
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organization or denominational group or entity,
then nothing in this subsection shall require the
policy to cover any diagnosis or treatment that is
contrary to the religious tenets of such group or
entity. If the insurer or health maintenance
organization delivering the policy or issuing the
policy for delivery in this state is operated,
sponsored or controlled by or in connection with a
religious organization or denominational group or
entity, then nothing in this subsection shall
require the policy to cover any diagnosis or
treatment that is contrary to the religious tenets of
2
such insurer or health maintenance organization.
The definition of the exempt organization is a key factor in
drafting a conscience clause. The senate bill is fairly broad and
would include agencies with a specifically religious purpose, such
as parishes, as well as those that pursue partly-secular missions,
such as schools, social service agencies, or hospitals that are
controlled by a diocese or religious community. There are other
states, however, which have defined the exemption in much
narrower terms. For example, the contraceptive mandate law in
California grants an exemption only to a "religious employer"
that satisfies each of four conditions:
(A) The inculcation of religious values is the purpose of the
entity.
(B) The entity primarily employs persons who share the
religious tenets of the entity.
(C) The entity serves primarily persons who share the
religious tenets of the entity.
(D) The entity is a nonprofit organization pursuant to
Section 6033(a)(2)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue
S.3, 2001 Leg. at http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=S0003&sh=t (last
visited Nov. 5, 2001). The following states have included some form of
conscience clause in their legislation: California, Connecticut, Delaware,
2

Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Nevada, North Carolina, Rhode Island and
Texas. See National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 1, availableat
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/contrace.htm (last updated Oct. 2001).
See
Federal employee benefit plans also contain conscience exemptions.
Treasury and Referral Government Appropriations Act § 635.
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Code of 1986, as amended.3
Clearly the California statute offers an extremely restricted
exemption from the contraception mandate. For instance, it
would not cover Church organizations that serve the general
public and do not engage in religious education, such as Catholic
Charities agencies, or Catholic-owned hospitals, and it would not
even reach inner-city schools, which admit a majority of nonCatholic students. As a result, Church agencies must monitor
legislative developments very carefully to determine the actual
impact of the proposed laws and the impact of purported
conscience clauses on their actual operations.
II. FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A.

The Standardfor Free Exercise Claims

Prior to 1990, it was generally understood that the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment required that the
government not impose a substantial burden on conduct
motivated by religion, unless it can show that there is a
compelling government interest and that the law is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest. This rule was established in the
case of Sherbert v. Verner,4 and was long considered to be the
settled standard for federal Free Exercise claims. This is a very
stringent test, at least in theory, and its most prominent
application was in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 5 where an Amish parent's
First Amendment rights were held to have been violated by
compulsory education laws.
However, in Employment Division v. Smith,6 the Supreme
Court ruled that states are not required by the First Amendment
to recognize religious exceptions to laws of general applicability.
3 CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D) (Deering Supp. 2000).
The
provision from the Internal Revenue Code only encompasses "churches, their
integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches.... [or] the
exclusively religious activities of any religious order."
26 U.S.C.
§6033(a)(2)(A)(i), (iii) (1994). A substantially similar conscience clause was
contained in an insurance mandate bill, passed by the New York State Senate
in the 2002 session. See s.625, 2002 Leg. available at http://assembly
.state.ny.us/legbn=506265 (lastvisited February 26, 2002).
4 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
5 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
6 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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The Court's holding means that religious institutions and
individuals cannot automatically rely on the Constitution as a
shield against unacceptable laws or regulations that are neutral
on their face and that apply to everyone - no matter how much it
may burden their religious beliefs. The facts of Smith are very
important: the law in question worked to impose penalties on the
consumption of peyote by Native Americans who believed that
this practice was central to their religious faith. While the law
may have been formally neutral - treating religious practice no
differently from any other activity - it prohibited an act of prayer
and worship. If such a core element of religious life does not
require an exemption from a general law, then little else may be
immune from regulation.
Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Smith contains strong
language about the liability of religious groups to regulations
enacted through the political process. Indeed, the Court seemed
unconcerned that unpopular religions may be victimized by
burdensome laws enacted in ignorance of or with indifference to
their beliefs:
Values that are protected against government
interference through enshrinement in the Bill of
Rights are not thereby banished from the political
process . . .It may fairly be said that leaving
accommodation to the political process will place at
a relative disadvantage those religious practices
that are not widely engaged in; but that
unavoidable
consequence
of
democratic
government must be preferred to a system in
which each conscience is a law unto itself or in
which judges weigh the social importance of all
laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. 7
Congress attempted to overrule the Smith decision by
enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.8
However, in City of Boerne v. Flores,9 the Supreme Court found
the statute unconstitutional (at least as it applied to state laws)
and re-affirmed its decision in Smith. It must be recognized that
7 Id. at 890.
8

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-1.

9 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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since Smith, only three of the current members of the Court have
expressed their disagreement with the rule of that case or a
desire to re-examine it. The other six Justices have either openly
or implicitly accepted Smith. It is thus extremely unlikely that
the Supreme Court will reinstate the Sherbert rule in the near
future.
B. Exceptions to the Smith Rule
There is little doubt that the Smith rule is extremely
unfavorable to any litigant seeking to obtain an exemption from a
statute based on religious objections. However, the Supreme
Court did recognize several circumstances in which the state
would still be required to satisfy the compelling interests test:
when a law is passed whose object "is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation,"10 when another
fundamental right, such as free speech, is violated along with
religious liberty rights," and when the government permits
exceptions in some cases but denies one to a religious objector.12
The Supreme Court has given an indication of its approach
to applying a Smith exception in a case involving a local law that
proscribed animal sacrifice. 13 Finding that the law was not
neutral and generally applicable, the Court applied the
compelling interests test, and found the statute unconstitutional.
The basis of this holding was that Santeria religious practices
were being specifically targeted for prohibition, 14 and the ban on
religious killing of animals was not applied equally to other
forms of animal killing.'5
In light of Church of Lukumi, in seeking to determine if one
can claim the protection of one of the Smith exceptions, a series
of questions should be asked about the statute in question, and
the way it is being enforced:16
10 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533 (1993).
11 Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990). There can
be no question that this "hybrid" right exception does not apply to the insurance
mandate bill, since no other fundamental constitutional rights are implicated.
Id. at 882.
12 See id. at 883-84.
13 Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 526.
14 Id. at 534-35.
15 Id. at 542-45.
16 Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil is in the Details: Neutral, Generally
Applicable Laws and Exceptions from Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1076-83
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1. Neutrality
With regard to whether a statute is neutral, the fundamental
concern is whether it aims to restrict conduct purely because it is
religiously motivated. 1'7 Three questions should be asked about
the law: does the law target religion on its face; even if it does
not, is it discriminatory in its object or purpose; and even if there
is a discriminatory intent, "[d]oes the law discriminate in its
actual operation or effect?"18
Under this test, the New York State Assembly insurance
mandate bill, which contains no conscience clause, would not
qualify for the exception from the Smith rule. Unlike the
ordinance in Church of Lukumi, there is no evidence that
Catholic religious practices are being targeted or, that Church
organizations are being treated differently from any other faith.
Moreover, the legislation in question applies to many other
employers and the majority of insurance providers. It is also
probably insufficient proof of anti-Catholic animus that the
legislation would have a disproportionate impact on Church
agencies, because of their unique faith-based objections. 9 By
way of comparison, it can be argued that the California law fails
the neutrality test by being discriminatory in its effect, since it
offers favorable treatment only to those religions whose
institutions fit within its narrow definition.
As a result, although some of the bill's supporters may
indeed harbor religious bias against Catholics, the most that can
plausibly be claimed, based on the public record, is that the
Legislature is indifferent to Catholic concerns or that it views
them as less compelling than the government interest at stake.
That is probably not enough to convince a court that the bill does
not fall within the reach of the Smith rule. Instead, it seems
clear that legal arguments regarding the mandate bills should
not focus on alleged anti-religious bias, which creates an
excessively high burden of proof on religious objectors, but rather
on any inequitable application of the law.20
(2000).

17 See Church of Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (citing Smith, 494 U.S. 878-79).
18 Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1077.
19

See, e.g., St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 332-36 (D. Md.

1990).
20 See Douglas Laycock, The Supreme Court and Religious Liberty, 40 CATH.
LAW. 25 (2000).
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2. GeneralApplicability
As to whether the law is truly generally applicable, the issue
is whether the legislation targets the practices of a particular
religion for discriminatory treatment "through their design,
construction, or enforcement."21 Two questions should be asked:
is the law designed to achieve a general or a specific purpose; and
is the law constructed so that in its actual operation it targets
only religious conduct or singles out a particular religion.22
Again, it is clear that the Assembly's insurance mandate bill
would not qualify for the exception to the Smith rule. The bill
makes clear on its face that it intends to reach all insurance
plans and employers.
It is thus unlikely that it can be
established that the bill was constructed to target only religious
objections, or to single out the Catholic Church.
3. Individualized Exceptions
When considering whether a statute falls outside Smith
because it permits "individualized exemptions," the focus is not
just on the terms of the law, but also on its enforcement. In
particular, the issue is whether executive discretion is being
exercised in a way that is impartial between religious groups,
23
and between religious and secular concerns.
It is clear that if exceptions are granted for secular concerns,
then religious interests must be treated equally and cannot be
denied comparable treatment.24 To determine whether the law is
being improperly enforced two questions should be asked: is
there a provision in the law that permits the exercise of
unchecked discretion; and if so, is that discretion being exercised
25
in a discriminatory way.
Obviously, it cannot be certain how the pending assembly
21 Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1078 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 557 (Scalia,
J., concurring)).
22 See id. at 1078-79.
23 See id. at 1081.
24 See Laycock, supra note 20, at 3. (reasoning that "the legislature cannot
place a higher value on some well-connected secular interest group with no
particular constitutional claim than it places in the free exercise of religion").
See also Fraternal Order of Police v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 360 (3d Cir.
1999) (holding that police department that allowed exemptions for the
prohibition of beards for secular reasons but not religious reasons violated the
First Amendment).
25 See Kaplan, supra note 16, at 1081.
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bill would be enforced. On its face, however, it contains neither
explicit exceptions nor authorization for administrative
discretion in enforcement. In contrast, the California law may be
vulnerable to attack under this test, since its conscience clause
implicitly creates authority to determine whether a Church
agency has the purpose of inculcating religious values, and
whether it serves and employs co-religionists "primarily." The
latter is such an amorphous term that it could easily be seen as a
grant of almost unchecked discretion.
The question of whether a law grants individualized
exceptions may depend on how widely the net is cast. For
instance, the same section of the New York State Insurance Law
that would be amended by the contraceptive bill actually
contains many exceptions, including one that is specific to certain
religious organizations. 26 However, the lower courts that have
considered this exception have focused on the specific law from
which a religious exemption is sought, rather than searching
27
through other provisions in the statute.
As a result, it seems likely that the insurance mandate bill
will not qualify for the Smith exception under this test.
In conclusion, it seems clear that under current
jurisprudence, as set forth by the Supreme Court in Smith, the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment would not require
a conscience exception to the New York State Assembly's
insurance mandate law.
III. STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. The Standardfor Free Exercise Claims
Given the inhospitable climate of federal constitutional
jurisprudence, it is necessary to examine if Church organizations
can obtain relief under the state constitution.
A state
constitutional argument should not be a mere afterthought to a
26 N.Y. INS. CODE § 3221(e)(9) (McKinney 2000) (relating to eligibility
requirements for group or blanket accident and health insurance policies).
27 See, e.g., Fraternal Order of Police, 170 F.3d 359; but see Church of
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (in considering
whether the law was neutral and generally applicable, the Court did not confine
its analysis to the challenged ordinances, but looked to other provisions of state
and municipal law governing killing of animals).
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federal claim, but should be presented as a major point of any
challenge to the mandate bills. In fact, one scholar has stated
that "it is malpractice not to plead, brief and fully develop your
state constitutional free exercise claim."28
The right to practice religion is defined in Article I, Section 3
of the New York State Constitution. Section 3 provides, in
relevant part, that:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed in this state to
all mankind; . . . but the liberty of conscience
hereby secured shall not be construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices
29
inconsistent with the peace or safety of this state.
Section 3, like most provisions of the State Constitution, has
been the subject of very few judicial interpretations. The Court
of Appeals has not yet adopted the Smith standard for Section
3.30
In one case, the Appellate Division relied upon the
traditional balancing test derived from Sherbert as the state
constitutional standard.3 1 In another, however, the court applied
both the Smith and Sherbert standards, even though it appears
that only a federal free exercise claim was made.32
The Court of Appeals has maintained that the State
Constitution guarantees a higher level of individual rights than
the federal constitution. For instance, the court has said that "on
Laycock, supra note 20, at 43.
N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 3.
30 See Miller v. McMahon, 684 N.Y.S.2d 368, 370 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1998)
("The Court of Appeals has not definitively stated whether the scope of [Section
3] is coextensive with the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment... nor
has it decided whether the analytical approach adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in... Smith should be applied."). See also Grumet v. Pataki,
720 N.E.2d 66 (N.Y 1999) (which did not even cite Smith, although the federal
Free Exercise Clause was an issue); New York State Employment Relations Bd.
v. Christ The King Reg'l High Sch., 682 N.E.2d 960 (NY 1997) (applying the
Smith standard, but only as a matter of federal law, since a state constitutional
claim was not raised).
31 Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Corr. Servs., 615 N.Y.S.2d 470, 47273 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1994) (declaring the hair length policy of the Dep't of
Corrections violated petitioner's right to free exercise of religion).
32 Lightman v. Flaum, 717 N.Y.S.2d 617, 626 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2000)
(explaining that under either the Smith or Sherbert standard, the relevant New
York statute is consitituional).
28
29
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innumerable occasions this court has given our State
Constitution an independent construction, affording the rights
and liberties of the citizens of this State even more protection
than may be secured under the United States Constitution."33 In
addition, it may be argued that the wording of the constitutional
provision itself - a broad statement of the free exercise right,
limited only by authority to regulate practices that are licentious
or that affect peace or safety - implies that the appropriate
34
standard is the Sherbert balancing test.
It is also worth noting that Section 3 is cast specifically in
terms similar to the Equal Protection Clause, in that it
guarantees that there can be no "discrimination or preference" in
the free exercise of religion. In fact, the analysis in some of the
old decisions on Section 3 have centered precisely on disparate
treatment of religious denominations. 35 New York courts have
long adhered to the notion that the law may not show preferences
for one religion over another, and have not sought to intervene in
internal disputes regarding the validity of church doctrines. 36
Indeed, the courts have been particularly solicitous in protecting
7
the integrity of smaller denominations that are unpopular3
This may favor the adoption of the Smith test, which emphasizes
the examination of the neutrality and general applicability of a
law and would thus focus precisely on the question of disparate
treatment.
It is possible, but by no means certain, that when the issue is
squarely presented, the Court of Appeals may choose to follow
the more protective Sherbert rule, rather than adopting the

33 Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, Inc., 379 N.E.2d 1169, 1173 (N.Y. 1978)
(interpreting the State Constitution's due process clause).
34 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith
Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1109, 1117-18 (1990) (discussing a similar
provision of the colonial-era Georgia constitution).
35 See e.g., O'Neill v. Hubbard, 40 N.Y.S.2d 202 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1943);
In re Saunders, 37 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1942) (invalidating
provisions of the Domestic Relations Law permitting marriages to be performed
only by ministers of certain denominations ).
36 See e.g., People v. Steele, 333 N.Y.S.2d 959, 960, 963 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Co.
1972) (dismissing complaint and refusing to interpret church doctrine where
nuns and a Catholic lay teacher were charged with distorting a religious service
because they were lying in a central aisle during high mass).
37 See e.g., Saunders, 37 N.Y.S.2d at 343 (invalidating statute which
required that ministers of certain religions must perform marriages as a
violation of freedom of religion).
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Smith standard. Assuming that the courts were to apply a
standard similar to the traditional Sherbert test, it would involve
a two-part analysis:
(1) whether the party claiming the free exercise
right has established a sincerely held religious
belief that is burdened by the statutory
requirement; and (2) whether the State has
demonstrated that "the requirement nonetheless
serves a compelling governmental purpose, and
that an exemption would substantially impede
fulfillment of that goal."38
Accordingly, the question is whether the goal of the
contraceptive mandate is a compelling governmental purpose,
and whether that purpose is being "pursued by the least
restrictive means."3 9 The burden then rests on the state to prove
with "particularity how its.. .strong interest.. .would be
adversely affected by granting an exemption... "40
Although the Sherbert test appears to be very respectful of
religious liberty in theory, it does not guarantee victory to a
religious objector. For instance, after the Yoder decision in 1972,
the Supreme Court rejected every claim that sought an
exemption from burdensome laws or policies based on the Free
Exercise Clause, except for those involving unemployment
compensation, which were governed by clear precedent.41 Indeed,
one study has found that in the cases decided under the shortlived Religious Freedom Restoration Act, which essentially
codified the Sherbert test, the courts ruled in favor of fewer than
one-third of the religious objectors; this was only a slightly higher
success rate than cases decided under the Smith rule.42 Although
the New York Court of Appeals may be more open to the Sherbert
test, one should not assume that a Free Exercise argument offers
38 Miller v. McMahon, 684 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (App. Div. 4th Dep't 1998)
(quoting Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 426 (N.Y.
1989)).
39 Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 429.
40 Id. (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972)).
41 See McConnell, supra note 34, at 1109-10 (discussing the stability of the
free exercise doctrine until the theory of religious discrimination in employment
arose).
42 See Craig Anthony Arnold, Religious Freedom as a Civil Rights Struggle,
2 NEXUS 149, 152 (1997).
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43
automatic relief.

B. Burden on Sincerely Held Religious Beliefs
Church organizations should not take for granted that the
courts will find their religious beliefs to be burdened by
insurance mandates. 44 Nor can they presume that the courts will
understand the nature or substance of their beliefs, or the
theology that underlies them, unless they engage in forthright
and strong advocacy to explain their faith.
Therefore, the Church should not place too much reliance on
the Ethical and Religious Directives or on Canon Law, which
may strike a non-Catholic as having little more religious
significance than self-serving corporate by-laws. Instead, the
Church's teaching must be presented in a forceful way that ties
directly into
its position on contraception treatments
fundamental articles of faith on the sacrament of marriage, the
nature of the human person, the meaning of human sexuality,
the dignity of human life, the nature of the church, and
ultimately the Fifth and Sixth Commandments. The Church
should not hesitate to cite definitive pronouncements, such as
Gaudium et spes, 4 5 Humanae Vitae,46 Donum Vitae,4 7 and
43 Compare Ware, 550 N.E.2d at 424 (holding that exposure to an AIDS
curriculum could destroy the foundation of certain religious groups' faith), with
Soc'y for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E.2d 922, 926 (N.Y. 1980) ("Although
the Society is concededly entitled to First Amendment protection as a religious
organization, this does not entitle it to immunity from reasonable government
regulation [i.e., a landmark designation] when it acts in purely secular
matters.").
44 Compare Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization of Cal., 493
U.S. 378, 392 (1996) (holding that California's imposition of sales and use tax
liability on sales of religious materials does not contravene the Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment) and Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680, 694 (1989)
(ruling that payments made to the Church's branch churches for auditing and
training services are not deductible as charitable contributions with St. Agnes
Hosp. v. Riddick 784 F. Supp. 319, 332 (D. Md. 1990) (asserting that a hospital
accreditation association was not required to exempt a Roman Catholic hospital
from its requirement that all obstetrics gynecology residency programs provide
clinical training in family planning).
45 SECOND VATICAN ECUMENICAL COUNCIL PASTORAL CONSTITUTION ON THE

(examining the human
search for meaning: our origins, our goals in life, the presence of sin and
suffering, the inevitability of death, and promoting the dignity and holiness of
matrimony and family life).
46
PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER HUMANE VITAE (1968) (regulating
contracaption and birth as an act of conjugal love in marriage).
CHURCH IN THE MODERN WORLD, GAUDIUMETSPES (1965)
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Evangelium Vitae.48 The court must be convinced that it is not
dealing with mere technical disciplinary rules, but instead with
integral parts of core Catholic doctrine that are given by divine
revelation.
This overtly theological argument is the bedrock of the Free
Exercise claim. The courts will not respect the need for an
exemption unless they appreciate the significance of the burden
these laws impose on Catholic beliefs. In addition, the Church
should emphasize the personal, rather than merely the
institutional, impact of these laws. It should be stressed that
the failure to grant conscience protection means that thousands
of Catholics will be forced to pay for medicines and procedures
they find morally repugnant, and that priests and bishops will be
forced by state law to directly support conduct that they would
otherwise seek to oppose or correct in their preaching, teaching
and sacramental activity (e.g., in the Sacrament of
Reconciliation).
This argument cannot be presented in conclusory or
legalistic terms. Instead, it must be crafted by moral and
dogmatic theologians, with a goal of catechizing the court about
fundamental elements of Catholic belief. Unless the Church
demonstrates the true significance of contraception and abortion
to the Catholic faith, it will never be able to convince the courts
of the injustice of denying it of freedom from these laws.
The importance of close attention to the nature of the burden
on Catholic religious belief and practice cannot be
underestimated.
Under the Sherbert test, the courts must
inquire into the sincerity of a person's religious beliefs and the
centrality of the conduct in question to those beliefs, in order to
assess whether the claimed burden on free exercise was
substantial.49 Although the courts were clearly uncomfortable
with this role, and scholars recognized the difficulties inherent in
it, the courts still conducted inquiries into the legitimacy and

47 Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Donum Vitae, in GIFT OF LIFE 1
(Edmund D. Pelligrino et al., ed. 1990) (calling for the respect of human life

from the moment of conception in the face of technological intervention
processes).
4
8 JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE (1995) (discussing

the inherent value and sanctity of all human life).
49 See e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963).
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sincerity of religious belief.5° As a result, it is vital to realize that
in conducting this analysis, courts have on occasion taken a very
narrow view of the rights of religious organizations, especially
those engaged in commercial activity.
In Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization of
California, the Supreme Court unanimously held that a state's
imposition of taxes on a religious organization's sale of religious
materials did not violate the First Amendment. 5 1 While it may
seem unexceptional to subject commercial activity to generallyapplicable taxes, the Court's reasoning is very troubling: it stated
that burdens on religion are "not constitutionally significant"
unless they substantially pressure a believer to violate specific
doctrinal tenets of their faith. 52 To support this principle, the
Court cited earlier decisions that limited inquiry under the Free
Exercise Clause to circumstances where a substantial burden is
placed "on the observation of a central religious belief or
practice."53
In particular, the Swaggart Court cited Hernandez v.
Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 54 which held that payments made to
the Church of Scientology's branch churches for auditing and
training services are not deductible charitable contributions.
Interestingly, in Hernandez the Court asserted that "[ilt is not
within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular
beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular
litigants' interpretations of those creeds."55 It did just that,
however, by finding that "[ni either the payment nor the receipt of
taxes is forbidden by the Scientology faith generally, and
Scientology does not proscribe the payment of taxes in connection
with auditing or training sessions specifically." 56
Essentially, these cases create a very narrow range of
protected religious activities. Unless a law puts direct pressure
on a person to commit a sin or recant a defined dogma that is at
the heart of their faith - as the courts see it - the Free Exercise
50 See e.g. William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise
Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 308, 310-11 (1991).
51 Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 392.
52

Id. at 391-92.

Id. at 384-85 (citing Hernandez v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S.
680, 699 (1989)).
54 Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699.
53

55
56

Id.
Id.
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Clause offers them no protection. 57 Given the attitude of the
courts in Swaggart and Hernandez, it is far from guaranteed that
the courts will find the Church's religious beliefs to be burdened
by insurance mandate laws.
Indeed, unless the point is
presented persuasively, the courts may find that the bills are not
a burden on Catholic beliefs at all because there is no explicit ban
on insurance coverage for contraception in the central tenets of
the Catholic faith.
C. Compelling State Interest
Two potentially powerful arguments will likely be made to
establish compelling governmental purposes with regard to the
contraceptive mandate: the state's interest in preventing gender
discrimination, and the significant interest in family planning in
order to minimize risk of unplanned pregnancies to public safety
and welfare.
It is certain that the state can assert a compelling interest in
reducing unplanned pregnancies. Indeed, there is an abundance
of statutory and budgetary schemes to advance this goal, such as
the sizeable budgetary expenditures on the federal and state
level for family planning programs, as well as the much smaller
abstinence education programs in which Church agencies
participate.
There is also no doubt that the state has a compelling
interest in eliminating unjust discrimination based on gender.58
A recent ruling by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") illustrates the potential danger of the
argument that contraceptive mandates are in furtherance of this
interest.5 9 In response to a complaint filed by two female
employees, the EEOC found that the denial of contraceptive
coverage in an employee benefit plan violated Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Pregnancy
60
Discrimination Act.

57 See Douglas Laycock, Summary and Synthesis: The Crisis in Religious
Liberty, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 841 (1992).
58 See e.g, N.Y. ExEc. §§ 296(1)-(13) (West 2001).
59 EEOC
Decision,
available
at
http://www/eeoc.gov/docs/decision-contraception.html
(last visited December
14, 2000) (finding that exclusion of prescription contraceptives from a health
insurance plan violated Title VII).
60 See id. (relying on 42 U.S.C. §4002e(k)).
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This ruling is not binding on non-parties and is
distinguishable on its facts from the case of Church institutions:
it did not involve a religious employer or faith-based objections,
and the secular employer provided coverage that is comparable
to contraception, such as sterilization. However, the ruling is
still very significant. It suggests that the EEOC may rule the
same way in similar cases. It is also undoubtedly the forerunner
of litigation that would rely on a gender discrimination theory to
compel insurance coverage for contraception.
In its ruling, the EEOC adopted almost verbatim the
arguments presented in an article by a law professor whose work
was supported by the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, a
prominent organization dedicated to "reproductive rights."61 This
article argues that the states are obligated to enforce Title VII by
prohibiting health insurance plans from discriminating against
women in denying contraceptive coverage. 62 As a result, in
defending the contraception mandate, the state may argue that it
is fulfilling its duty to ensure that state law complies with Title
VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.
The response to the Title VII argument is to explain that the
Church's position regarding the denial of insurance coverage for
contraception is not an act of gender discrimination; rather, it is
based on the Church's theology of marriage and sexuality, and is
representative of other morality-based employment policies that
are applied even-handedly to men and women. For example,
there have been a number of instances in which Church agencies
have discharged employees for flouting Catholic moral doctrine
(i.e.., divorced teachers who remarry outside of the Church). The
Church does not provide employee benefits in situations that
offend its moral doctrine, regardless of whether it is being done
by male or female employees or their spouses (e.g., Church
agencies provide no coverage for male or female sterilizations or
for cohabiting couples or same-sex couples, and there is no
coverage for abortion). These policies have nothing to do with sex
discrimination, but everything to do with maintaining the
Church's moral integrity.
The courts have held that when religious organizations

61 See Silvia A. Law, Sex Discriminationand Insurance for Contraception,
73 WAsH. L. REV. 363 (1998).
62 Id. at 396.
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enforce their moral doctrine in an even-handed way, they do not
violate Title VII. For instance, the Sixth Circuit has held that if
a religious institution's purported discrimination is based on a
policy against non-marital sexual activity, which emanates from
its religious and moral doctrine, and if that policy is applied
equally to its male and female employees, then there is no
violation of Title VII.63
Furthermore, at least one court has held that the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act does not prohibit the denial of employee
benefits for pre-pregnancy conditions, such as infertility.64 In that
case, a hospital's exclusion of infertility treatment from its
employee medical benefits plan was found not to be a sex-based
classification because the exclusion applied equally to all
individuals, male and female. The court stated that "the plain
language of the PDA does not suggest that 'related medical
conditions' should be extended to apply outside the context of
'pregnancy' and 'childbirth.' Pregnancy and childbirth, which
occur after conception, are strikingly different from infertility,
which prevents conception."65 Clearly, this reasoning would also
apply to contraceptives.
It is also important to note that the court in Krauel
specifically distinguished International Union v. Johnson
Controls, Inc.,66 which held that a policy of prohibiting women of
child-bearing age from working in positions where they could be
exposed to chemicals that were potentially damaging to ova
and/or fetuses violated Title VII because it "explicitly classifies
on the basis of potential for pregnancy."67
Although one can expect a strong argument that the denial
of contraceptive coverage violates Title VII, Church organizations
have a reasonable argument in response, albeit one that is not
guaranteed to prevail.

See Boyd v. Harding Acad. of Memphis, Inc., 88 F.3d 410, 414-15 (6th
Cir. 1996); see also Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651, 658 (6th
Cir. 1999).
64 Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 95 F.3d 674, 679 (8th Cir. 1996).
65 Id. at 679.
66 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
67 Id. at 199, see also Michael Hawkins, Liberties in Conflict: The Free
Exercise Clause, Title VII, and Morality-Based Personnel Decisions in Religious
Schools, 27 J. L. & EDUC. 335 (1998).
63
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D. SubstantialImpairment of the Compelling State Interest
Assuming a court were to find a compelling state interest in
support of insurance mandates, the Sherbert test requires a
determination if this interest would override a religious person's
Free Exercise rights.6
The court must specifically evaluate
whether granting a religious exemption would substantially
impede the governmental goal.
In considering this part of the Sherbert test, it must be
recognized that religious organizations which engage in
commercial activity are highly vulnerable to government
regulation.
St. Agnes Hospital demonstrates this point by
presenting analogous facts to the present situation, that resulted
in a very unfavorable decision.69 A Catholic hospital brought suit
to retain accreditation of its residency program, which had been
withdrawn because of the hospital's refusal to perform and
provide clinical training in abortion, sterilization and
contraception. The hospital claimed that its free exercise rights
had been violated by the accreditation decision,70 and it relied
heavily on the Ethical and Religious Directives as statements of
the institution's Catholic beliefs.71
Applying the Sherbert
standard, the court agreed that the religious beliefs of the
hospital were being burdened.7 2 However, the court held that the
Free Exercise Clause did not require an exception because there
was a compelling government interest in ensuring satisfactory
education of physicians, including family planning training for
obstetricians/gynecologists.
Furthermore,
granting
an
accommodation to the hospital would "unduly interfere with the
accomplishment the governmental interest."73
One of the most significant factors in the court's analysis was
that in order to accomplish the objective of producing qualified
physicians who could practice medicine in any state, the training
program had to carried out on a uniform, nationwide basis. 74 The
court also found it to be "of critical importance" that the hospital
68 See Ware v. Valley Stream High Sch. Dist., 550 N.E.2d 420, 429-30 (N.Y.
1989) (determining whether the State's interest in AIDS education was so
compelling that it would override plaintiffs free exercise rights).
69 St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319 (D. Md. 1990).
70 Id. at 320.
71 Id. at 322-23.
72 Id. at 327-330.
73 Id. at 331 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259 (1982)).
74 Id.
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was training physicians of all faiths, and not just Catholics. 75
The court specifically relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
United States v. Lee 76 , which rested on the notion of uniform
national standards and the impropriety of imposing religious
beliefs on employees who do not follow them. '7 Strikingly, the
court stated that "[wihen followers of a particular sect enter into
commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept
on their own conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not
to be super-imposed on the statutory schemes which are binding
on others in that activity."78
The importance of this point cannot be underestimated
because many Church agencies are engaged in activities that are
arguably commercial, and they are licensed and regulated by the
state in a variety of ways. Catholic hospitals, nursing homes,
charities agencies and schools are all already subject to state
licensing and oversight. Even parishes are subject to general
laws governing employment.
The court's analysis in St. Agnes Hospital does offer some
hope. Certainly, a reasonable argument can be made that a
religious exemption from the insurance mandates would not
hamper the legislative goals because the exception would only
encompass a small percentage of New York employees.
Moreover, the Church can argue that the insurance mandates do
not necessarily depend on national or even statewide uniformity,
and thus a religious exemption would not be a barrier to their
success. In addition, the availability of other less-restrictive
approaches (e.g., mandating referrals to other insurance plans to
obtain the coverage) may also bolster the argument that the
state's objectives would not be impeded.
It must also be recognized, however, that the outlook is much
less hopeful if the New York courts follow the reasoning of Lee
and St. Agnes Hospital regarding the imposition of Catholic
beliefs on non-Catholic employees and insurance holders by a
Church agency engaged in commercial activity. Since this part of
the Sherbert test is necessarily a fact-based analysis, a close
analysis of the terms of the statute must be done, along with any

75

Id. at 330.

76 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
77 St. Agnes Hosp. 748 F. Supp. at 330 (citing Lee, 455 U.S. at 261).
78 Id. at 331 (quoting Lee, 455 U.S. at 261).
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implementing regulations, and the specific effects on the actual
work of Church agencies must be understood.
E. Equal Treatment of Religions
As noted above, the New York State constitutional provision
is written in terms reminiscent of the federal Equal Protection
Clause, since it prescribes that there be no "discrimination or
preference" in the free exercise of religion. 79 As a result, in
seeking a religious exemption from a statute, it would be relevant
to consider whether it grants preferential treatment to some
faiths over others. In this case, the answer is quite clear - the
Assembly bill does not provide for any exceptions, much less
exceptions for certain religions and not for others. However, if a
conscience clause modeled after the California law were included
in the bill, there may be a basis for attack because that provision
seems to favor some religious organizations, namely those that fit
within the narrow statutory definition.
The effectiveness of this equal protection argument may
depend on persuading the court to look beyond the particular
statute in question for statutory grants of special treatment. For
instance, one provision of New York law grants a religious
exemption to school children whose parents object to their being
immunized against certain illnesses .8o Since that statute directly
affects public health, which is also at issue in regard to the
contraception bills, an argument can be offered that the state is
showing preferential treatment to those faiths that disagree with
one form of medical treatment, while discriminating against
those that oppose contraception.
However, the few New York cases that have applied an equal
protection analysis under Section 3 have focused on the specific
statutory provision in question. Additionally, they have not
shown an inclination to search through the law books for other
instances of preferential treatment.8 1 Consequently, it is not
certain that exceptions found in other areas of the law will help
Church agencies escape from the contraceptive bills.
79 N.Y. CONST. art. I,

§ 3.

§ 2164(9) (2001) (exempting from the immunization
requirement those "children whose parent, parents, or guardian hold genuine
and sincere religious beliefs which are contrary to the practices herein
required...").
81 See In re Saunders, 37 N.Y.S.2d 341, 343 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1942).
8o N.Y. PuB. HEALTH
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In short, even if the New York courts apply the more
favorable Sherbert rule to Free Exercise cases, the prospects for
obtaining a religious exemption under the New York State
Constitution are very unclear.
IV. ALTERNATIVE WAYS TO OBTAIN PROTECTION
Efforts to obtain relief through state law, for instance
through individual conscience exceptions to insurance mandate
laws or a state Religious Freedom Restoration Act, might not
provide a sufficient shield against a gender discrimination claim
under Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.8 2 In any
event, a state RFRA modeled on the federal bill would merely
codify the Sherbert test, which, as discussed above, does not
guarantee that a religious organization will be able to obtain an
exception from the insurance mandate bill.
The most effective way to obtain protection for Church
employers would be to seek federal legislation in the form of an
amendment to ERISA, s8 which protects employee benefit plans
from "the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State and local
regulation".84 A conscience clause amendment to ERISA would
thus bar state governments from imposing morally-offensive
mandates on employee benefit plans.
This would, however, still leave insurance providers
vulnerable to state regulation.
In any attempt to provide
conscience protection for Church-owned insurance plans, it
should be recalled that City of Boerne precludes Congress from
overruling the Smith standard by legislation. Therefore, any
legislation granting conscience protection to insurance plans
must be based on specific authority entrusted to Congress in the
Constitution.85
82 See Law, supra note 61, at 399-400. Compare Bob Jones University v.
United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1982) (asserting that a compelling
government interest in eradicating racial discrimination overrides school's
religion-based objection to interracial dating); Roberts v. United States Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (holding that a strong compelling state interest in
preventing gender discrimination justifies restrictions on freedom of
association).
83 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1461.
84 Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 98-99 (1983) (noting that ERISA
pre-empted state law requiring the provision of pregnancy benefits).
85 See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (2000) (relying on the Spending and Commerce
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CONCLUSION

Since the Supreme Court has interpreted the Free Exercise
Clause of the federal First Amendment very narrowly, a religious
objection will not ordinarily justify an exemption from a valid,
neutral law of general applicability. Even assuming that New
York State courts would apply a broader standard under the
state constitution, requiring proof of a compelling government
interest that is being pursued in the least restrictive way, there
is no guarantee that litigation to obtain a religious exemption
will be successful. As a result, the Church may be hard pressed
to find a safe harbor for its religious beliefs regarding the
immorality of contraception, and may be faced with the
unpalatable choice of conforming to the values of society or
finding other avenues to maintain its integrity.

Clauses).

168

41 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 2

